Time to listen to your corporate Cassandra

In Greek myths, Cassandra was able to see the future, but no one ever believed what she was saying. Richard Clarke has written a new book examining this in a very quantitative fashion, and it made me think about those among us that predict what is going to happen to our IT infrastructure but aren’t listened to by management. I know it is a bit of a reach, but bear with me.

I thought back to several moments when I worked in corporate jobs and had run up against some naysayer who didn’t like what I was saying. Sometimes, I got fired because my boss thought I was the naysayer. Sometimes, my prophecy came to pass and then my proposal was finally green-lighted. And sometimes I had to run another play through a proxy or convince some other department to carry my idea forward.

In Clarke’s book, he describes a series of various disasters (Katrina, Fukushima) and how in each case there was a Cassandra who warned about the potential issues but these warnings fell on deaf ears.  He then provides mechanisms and suggestions on how to reverse this and how to better pay attention.

Why are these warnings ignored? Several factors: inertia, character flaws of the participants, lack of planning, or ineffective leadership. Sometimes it is a combination of all of the above, making the issue too complex for a single individual or line of business to resolve. One of the things that I learned in my leadership class several years ago is how to assess various inputs, often conflicting ones, to determine a course of action. The best leaders know how to do this instinctively, and not just stick their heads in the sand and continue on. It is about listening critically to what the Cassandras are saying.

Wikipedia says in its entry that Cassandra is employed as a rhetorical device by many modern tales. One of my favorite ones is the Gilliam original movie Twelve Monkeys. There the character played by Bruce Willis is sent back in time to try to figure out the source of a pandemic that wipes out most of the world’s human population, only to be frustrated by not being understood by the people he interacts with. (If you haven’t seen the movie, make sure you see the 1995 original and not the remake — which is miserable.) Willis is considered crazy, but eventually enlists a shrink to help him with his investigations.

Pick up a copy of Clarke’s book, (re)watch the movie, and make a promise to listen the next time your corporate Cassandra speaks up.

CSO Online: How to protect your network from PowerShell exploits

Hikers living off the land make use of existing nutrients and water sources to survive in the wilderness. In hacker parlance, the term “survive in the wilderness” means they cover their tracks and make use of tools and code that already exist on targeted endpoints. This hides their exploits by making them look like common administrative tasks so that detection tools can’t easily find them. Welcome to the world of PowerShell-based attacks.

PowerShell has become increasingly sophisticated and in an article I wrote for CSO Online, I show you how attackers can leverage this language for their own evil purposes.

When to think about a cyber security do-over

This is a piece that I co-authored with Greg Matusky and Mike Lizun of Gregory FCA. 

Imagine you’re on the precipice of greatness, some victory that will define you or your enterprise for eternity. Something important, game-changing, like going public, executing a merger, or something even bigger, like winning your first ever Super Bowl after 50 years of frustration.

And then it’s all lost. Stolen in the dark of night by someone who hacks your system and steals the secret sauce. Maybe it’s your IP or some market advantage. Or maybe it was simply the plays you plan to call that now will be used against your organization. ​

A lot of football fans, players, and coaches believe that is exactly what happened in 2005 when the New England Patriots beat the Philadelphia Eagles in Super Bowl XXXIX.

Even during that game, Philadelphia coaches knew something was amiss and tried to change set play calls. Every time the Eagles’ defensive coach blitzed, Tom Brady knew it and made a quick outlet pass. Two years later, the Patriots were fined $250,000 and draft picks for getting caught videotaping and the stealing the play calls from the New York Jets. A U.S. senator opened an investigation and found New England had been wrongly videotaping and stealing opponent play calls since 2000.

This year, after the Eagles beat New England, there’s been a lot of scuttlebutt about secret security measures the Eagles deployed to thwart any and all intrusions. One story holds that Philadelphia ran a fake practice the Saturday before the game, running plays and using a play call system they had no intention of using. Whether it happened or not, you gotta believe the Eagles weren’t going to be robbed again. Something did work. New England didn’t have a clue as to what the Eagles were doing on offense. They didn’t know about their calls and the result was Philadelphia putting up 538 total yards of offense.

Not every business gets to have a do-over like the Eagles. And in most cases, when it comes to cyber security and data breaches, hindsight is always 20-20. As an example, look at this recent Ponemon survey of 1,200 IT professionals. It found that the majority of them aren’t satisfied with cyber threat sharing tools in terms of timeliness, accuracy, and the poor quality of actionable information. Some of this has to do with a johnny-come-lately realization that threat intel could have been used to prevent a previous attack. Even UK-based telecom provider BT is now sharing its threat intel with its competitors, to try to stem attackers. So maybe the tide is changing.

There are lots of other cybersec lessons that could be learned from the latest Super Bowl matchup and what organizations can do when they get a second chance at defending their networks. They involve the role that revenge can play in motivating ex-employees, deliberate attempts to confuse attackers, and using specific traps to flush out intruders and confuse adversaries.

First, let’s look at revenge attacks.

These happen when insiders or former insiders get motivated by something that they experienced, and want to take out their frustration on their former employer.

The classic insider revenge scenario dates back to 1999, when Vitek Boden was applying for a job for the Maroochy county sewer district in Australia. He was a contractor for the district and the county decided not to hire him. To seek revenge, he caused thousands of gallons of raw sewage to be dumped into the local waterways, using a series of radio commands. He was eventually caught by a police officer with various RF equipment. What is important to note is that Boden had all this insider knowledge, yet never worked for the agency that he attacked. He was able to disguise his actions and avoid immediate detection by the agency IT department, which never had any security policies or procedures in place for disgruntled employees.

Ofer Amitai, the CEO of Portnox, has a more modern revenge tale. One of his customers is a big food company that didn’t pay attention to who was connected to its WiFi network. It had one employee who was fired, and came back to the vicinity of the plant with his own laptop. He changed temperatures on the refrigerators and destroyed hundreds of thousands of dollars of merchandize in revenge.

From these two examples, you can see it pays to be careful, even if a former employee never steps foot on your property or even if you never hired your potential attacker. Certainly, you should better screen insiders to prevent data leaks or willful destruction. And businesses should always monitor their wireless networks, especially as it is simple for an intruder to connect a rogue access point to your network and access data through it.

What about ways to obfuscate attackers?

Like in the Super Bowl, teams are now more careful about how they call plays during the game and practice times. Teams now use an array of sideline ruses to confuse prying eyes, everything from placards with pictures of Homer Simpson to using as many as three decoy sideline play callers.

That’s not too dissimilar to planting special “honeynets” on networks. Typically, they consist of a web server and a stripped-down operating system with tracking software that registers when a hacker tries to compromise the system. These servers don’t contain any actual data, but appear to be a target to a potential attacker and can trap them into revealing their location, sources, or methods that can help network defenders strengthen their security. Honeynets have been around for more than a decade and have an active development community to make them more life-like to confound attackers.

“There will always be timely weaknesses during such events that hackers can exploit,” says Dudu Mimran, the CTO of Telekom Innovation Laboratories in Israel. “Public events such as the Super Bowl present an opportunity because many people will be using digital devices and posting pictures and opening emails around the event. Defenders need to understand the expected sequence of actions around these events and create pinpoint defenses and guidelines to reduce the expected risks. There needs to be a series of layered defenses coupled with user education and better awareness too.”

Good luck with your own do-overs.

What’s new with blockchain and security

The world of bitcoin, blockchain and cryptocurrencies is moving so fast that it is hard to keep up, even if you try to follow current events. Certainly, it has been some wild times lately as the trading prices of these currencies has escalated wildly. This post will review some of my own interests, namely some interesting places where you might want to read up more about blockchains and the intersection of these technologies with IT security.

Probably a good place to start is with my sister newsletter, Inside Bitcoin, researched and written by David Stegon three times a week. Like my own Inside Security newsletter, it comes packed with tons of great content, current events, trading prices of the leading currencies and more. For example, in today’s issue you can find out that soon the electricity used for bitcoin mining will account for the bigger power usage than for people’s homes in Iceland.

If you are looking to learn more about cryptocurrency basics, the VC firm Andressen Horowitz has put together this page of links it calls is Crypto Canon. There are a lot of beginner’s guides about privacy and security and tutorials for developers. Another really great source that goes into details about the actual mechanics of the blockchain protocols can be found in the current issue of the Internet Protocol Journal. Written by Bill Stallings, it is a clear and solid explanation of how the blockchain works to self-authenticate transactions, which are at the core of this brave new world.

If you haven’t gotten enough of a fix, I humbly suggest next taking a look at a blog post that I wrote for the iBoss blog about recent blockchain exploits. Criminals are coming online, stealing funds from digital wallets, attacking currency exchanges, deploying hidden miners and going after initial coin offerings. This latter event is similar to an IPO for blockchain companies, only instead of receiving dollars (or some other real currency), they get cryptocoins, often newly minted. The opportunity for abuse and fraud is limitless, and some companies have already “mysteriously” disappeared after their ICO.

The hidden cryptominers are particularly pernicious. An average exploit can generate $500 a day per PC that has been compromised. Set up a network of a few thousand machines and you are literally creating cash while you sleep.

But blockchains can be used for improving and innovating when it comes to IT security too. Here are a few examples:

  • Shocard uses blockchains to provide an identity authentication system so that people can share information with each other securely.
  • Hypr is similar, encrypting a user’s credentials but doing so without any centralized authority needed to vouch for them or store the information.
  • Microsoft is adding blockchain features so that its Authenticator app can manage all kinds of user identity data and cryptographic keys.
  • CertCoinis one of the first implementations of blockchain-based PKI. The project, developed at MIT, removes central authorities altogether and uses the blockchain as a distributed ledger of domains and their associated public keys.
  • Guardtime built the identity management platform for the Estonian government and now sells its KSI blockchain-based enterprise security tools. Changes to the network configuration have to be authorized, making it harder for malware to gain access.
  • Maidsafe has created an alternative Internet where users are able to run apps, store data, and do everything else they normally do online, but in a more secure environment.
  • And IBM and Maersk have built a blockchain-based digital trading system to track shipments of the global logistics company.

We have just seen the very tip of the iceberg when it comes to using these technologies, both for good and evil. Send me your favorite bitcoin/blockchain product or anecdote if you don’t mind sharing.

 

 

 

 

iBoss blog: The Many Forms of Cryptocurrency Exploits

While the prices on cryptocurrencies have been all over the place in recent months, it is certainly attracting a different kind of attention from the criminal world that views them as malware opportunities. These attacks take numerous forms, including stealing funds from digital wallets, attacking currency exchanges, deploying hidden mining and initial coin offering (ICO) exploits.

The first major exploit was seen by the DAO joint Ethereum investment fund back in 2016, which suffered a DDoS attack and eventually had to shut down. While that grabbed major headlines, there have been other, less-publicized attacks on exchanges. I look at some of the more recent examples in my post for iBoss’ blog here.

iBoss blog: Ten ways to harden your WordPress servers

One of the weak points in your enterprise may be something that you haven’t paid much attention to, your WordPress servers. When you think more critically about the issue, there are a lot of exposed attack surfaces: a Web server running PHP scripts and accessing a SQL database. Sadly, criminals have long recognized this target and have begun to focus more of their efforts on exploiting WordPress servers. Indeed, this story from last summer’s DefCon conference demonstrated how hackers were able to locate a fresh new WP site within 30 minutes of going online. In my latest post for the iBoss blog, I talk about ways to make them more secure, such as adding the WordFence plug-in shown here.

FIR B2B Podcast #88: The Decline of Trust and New Twists on End-of-Year Research

This week, Paul Gillin and I examine the results of the 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer, which shows a remarkable drop in the overall trust from the public. Some alarming results from the annual survey:

  • Sixty-three percent of respondents say they do not know how to tell good journalism from rumor or falsehoods or if a piece of news was produced by a respected media organization.
  • Chinese citizens trust their government more than U.S. citizens trust theirs. 
  • Technology remains the most trusted industry sector of them all, with a trust rating of 75% (whew).
  • CEOs are becoming more trusted sources and are increasingly being asked to address public policy issues.
  • One-quarter of respondents said they read no media at all because it is too upsetting. 

In the second part of our discussion, we look at some examples of annual trends/reports in the security field that I have been studying for this post. For example, Kaspersky’s “story of the year” was about the rise of ransomware, and this set of predictions from ServiceNow are short and sweet, which is a nice break from the norm. Watchguard has been posting a series of predictions to its blog using short videos. All are noteworthy. We suggest B2B marketers review these tactics and see if they can apply to their own media relations efforts.

You can listen to our 17 min. podcast here:

The role of the WWII coder girls

I am reading the book Code Girls, the true story about the thousands of women who worked decoding WWII message traffic for the Army and Navy. It is a fascinating look at how they shaped the crypto and spying industries, and largely an unknown and untold story. I would recommend it highly for your own reading.

One of the women featured in this book is Elizebeth Friedman. She was one-half of a power couple that worked on code breaking and is documented in another book called The Woman Who Smashed Codes that came out last year. Her role is mentioned in Code Girls, but the focus is more on others who are even less famous. The couple met at the offices of an eccentric philanthropist named George Fabyan, who thought that Bacon wrote Shakespeare’s works and wanted some crackerjack researchers to prove it. The couple ended up falling in love with each other and disproving the Bacon theories once and for all.

There has been a lot written about the activities of the British coding group at Bletchley Park (and you can read some links to them here), but not as much about the parallel American efforts to decode the German Enigma and Japanese Purple codes that were used during the war. What is interesting about this book is how it talks about the lives of ordinary women who were plucked from being school teachers, clerks, and recent college graduates into this top-secret life in the nation’s capital and elsewhere to help the war effort.

Why were women chosen for this task? Several reasons. First, most of the men were off fighting the war, so the potential employment pool was diminished. Second, the military found that women made for better code breakers: they had better concentration and more of an eye for detail. Many of them were math and science majors and liked the kind of work that was involved – this was an era before we started telling girls that they weren’t good at math! Finally, the country needed thousands of them for this job. In some cases, entire graduating classes were hired on the spot. All of the women had no idea what they were signing up for, and often left their lives with nothing more than a few dollars in the pocket and a one-way train ticket to DC.

The Army and Navy had different recruiting strategies and set up competing organizations, based in different parts of DC. Early on, one group worked on messages that were received on odd-numbered days and one on even days. That wasn’t very productive, and eventually the two sorted out different theaters of war to focus on.

Two myths are busted in this book. The first is that people who were good at solving crossword puzzles made for good code breakers. That isn’t necessarily accurate, because crosswords are built with escalating clue difficulties, since most people start at the upper left and work their way down the puzzle. Code breaking is very tedious, and you have to deal with tons more frustration as you run into big roadblocks in figuring out patterns as the codes frequently change.

Second is that decoding intercepts could have helped prevent Pearl Harbor. That might have been the case had the US tuned up its efforts but that wasn’t possible during peacetime, given the climate that we had before we entered the war. Decoding intercepts was one of the reasons why we were able to dominate the Pacific theater and sink so many Japanese ships. Often, our military was reading their messages concurrently with their intended recipients, and had to stage a fake aircraft fly-over to hide the real source of their intelligence on the Japanese Navy’s movements.

An interesting side note: this past week my colleague Elonka Dunin (who has spent time with the Cryptos sculpture at the CIA headquarters building) published a paper about the Friedman tombstone and how it contains a hidden cipher. Can’t see it? Look closer. That is why most of us would be terrible code breakers.

 

HPE Enterprise.nxt: How to protect hidden Windows services from attacks

The hijacking legitimate but obscure Windows services is a tough exploit to detect. Here are two lesser known Windows services that could be vulnerable to malware attacks. You might think you can tell the difference between benign and malicious Windows services, but some of these services are pretty obscure. Do you know what ASLR and BITS are? Exactly.

You can read my latest article for HPE here.

Gregory FCA newsletter: How to get your annual year-end security reports noticed and read

It’s about as regular as hearing Auld Lang Syne on New Year’s Eve: The annual year-end security report issued by companies big and small looking to create awareness and build relationships. Our inboxes were flooded with dozens of them. In this newsletter that I co-authored with Greg Matusky and Mike Lizun, we look at some of the best and worst features of these annual reports and give our opinions. Hopefully you can use our findings to improve your own reports this time next year, and learn from the best and avoid the biggest mistakes.

The Scintillating Standouts of 2017!

Some of the more unusual reports are the ones that really caught our eyes.

Kaspersky’s “story of the year” takes the typical annual year-end report and transforms it into a cyber-security news story similar to People’s Person of the Year. Written in layman’s terms with an accompanying infographic, Kaspersky’s Story of the Year reworks the tired ransomware story into a can’t-not-read compendium on all things ransomware. And it’s understandable! The first line reads like the opening of a movie rather than a technical rehash. Consider, “In 2017, the ransomware threat suddenly and spectacularly evolved. Three unprecedented outbreaks transformed the landscape for ransomware, probably forever.”

Kasperksy then takes it one step forward by producing “The Number of the Year,” based on the number of malicious files its networks have seen transit its sensors. Our co-author David Strom calls it gimmicky, and maybe it is from his journalistic perch. But from a strictly PR perspective, the ability to distill a finding down to a single number (and one drawn from data at their ready disposal) is a brilliant PR take, and they are to be congratulated.

What about your organization? Do you have available internal data that could add PR gravitas to your next report? Might be something to consider.

Another take comes from ServiceNow. They opted to deliver their security predictions in a short-and-sweet format–one that takes less than three minutes to read. Their conclusions are compelling without overselling. For instance, they suggest that 2018 will see the emergence of security haves and have-nots–those having automated detection and response and those who don’t. Guess who sells such a solution? Still, they keep the sell to a minimum.

Watchguard uses their blog to make a series of predictions in a very attractive and still informative way. There are predictions about IoT botnets, a doubling of Linux-based attacks, what will happen to multi-factor authentication, and the state of election and voter hacking. Each prediction takes the form of a short video with high production values.

With all the news about Uber’s mistakes over the past year, here is a cogent analysis by Dark Reading of what Uber did wrong with its breach response: delayed notification, failure to implement stronger access controls, unclear approval workflows, storing access credentials in GitHub, and failing to compartmentalize data access. This analysis was a neat package that we wish others would emulate.

This report, which appeared in IBM’s Security Intelligence blog, is another rarity. It compares what few of these year-end surveys actually do by looking back a year and then scoring their predictions. The author looked at the threats posed by IoT, the rise of cybercrime-as-a-service, and the threats against brand reputations and concludes he was a bit ahead of the curve on some trends. We wish we would see more of these “truth telling” evaluation-type pieces.

Those were our top picks. But there are plenty of other year-end reports, most choosing one of three paths: presenting the results of a survey, focusing on a particular vertical market, or summarizing what telemetry they have collected from sensors located at major internet peering points or at their customers.

All in the Numbers: The Best of the Survey-Based Reports

Let’s look at the two best survey posts.

The State of Open Source Security” touches on both telemetry and survey methods. It presents the results of a survey of 500 open-source users combined with internal data from Snyk and scans of various GitHub repositories. Sadly, almost half of the code maintainers never audit their code, and less than 17 percent feel they have high security knowledge. Code vulnerabilities are on the rise for open-source projects but not for Red Hat Linux, which is an interesting factoid that isn’t often mentioned.

Beyond Trust’s report has a series of 18 predictions, most of which are obvious (bigger targets will fall, mobile spam on the rise, games can double as malware). A few are interesting, and what sets this report apart is a look ahead to five years from now when GDPR becomes untenable, online elections become secure, and the end of cash arrives.

Customer Telemetry-Based Reports Work Well Also

McAfee’s annual threat predictions have some interesting insights and cover some non-obvious subjects, including describing the machine learning arms race, the opportunities for serverless attackers, and the ways that home automation vendors will misuse your personal data.

Fortinet is another one of those companies that runs a massive protection network and can cull trends from its customers. Their quarterly threat report has identified 185 zero-day vulnerabilities, with an average of each customer experiencing more than 150 attacks over the quarter and unknowingly running an average of two botnets inside their networks. Like other security researchers, they talk about the delay to patching known exploits and how lousy most of their customers are at getting at root causes of infections.

Then there is Bitdefender’s insights into the past year’s threats. It is based on their own global sensor network and from their customers. Ransomware is still king, with one in every six spam emails including some kind of ransomware attack vector. Also on the rise this past year are crypto-currency miner malware, polymorphic attacks, and Android-based Trojans.

Dashlane’s report on the worst passwords of the year is entertaining, if a bit predictable. While they break all the rules about these year-in-review articles, it works. Yes, it is subjective, it is somewhat self-serving (Dashlane sells a password manager), and it covers familiar ground. But it is very amusing and that is why sometimes you can deliver old chestnuts in interesting ways.

Slicing and Dicing Vertical Markets in Reports 

Some vendors have taken a different tactic and written year-end reports that examine specific verticals. This is what eSentire has done with the healthcare industry. Rather than just positing the “chicken little” scenario, it provides specific case studies of security weaknesses in various enterprises that of course were eSentire customers and discovered malware on their networks. They conclude by saying that well-known exploits have been out for years and yet still aren’t patched. Yes, it is self-serving, but it is also instructive.

Another way to slice things is to just focus on bitcoin exploits, which have been increasing as its value rises. Incapsula looked at exploits across its own network and found three out of four bitcoin sites were attacked and a third of the network attacks were persistent attacks. Hong Kong was the most targeted country for bitcoin-based network layer assaults in Q3 2017, largely because of a persistent attack on a local hosting service that was hit hundreds of times throughout the quarter.

Another example is this report looking at mobile threats by RiskIQ. They used telemetry from their network of more than 120 different app stores and billions of endpoints. This is a rich source of exploits and a growing threat. It highlights the non-surprising trend toward using phony rave reviews to prop up a malicious app. It also reviews the collaboration over the takedown of the WireX botnet earlier this fall.

What to Avoid in Your Annual Report 

Finally, no compendium would be complete without mentioning some examples of what to avoid. As we mentioned in an earlier newsletter, having small survey sample sizes is never a good idea, and this report by Holger Schulze where he interviews 500 people forthis report for Alienvault is to be avoided. While it has numerous graphics that can be used in blog posts, it contains mostly subjective content.

Also to be avoided: reports that don’t say anything new, such as this report from Wandera on WiFi risks, or this report on security trends from Cipher. A corollary to this is to avoid predictions that are more self-serving or self-promotional, such as these from Axiomatics.

Another issue: checking your facts. In November, an organization called the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation posted a supposedly detailed review of the security compliance of hundreds of the more popular U.S. government websites. Sadly, the facts weren’t correct, and webmasters responded with complaints and corrections.

Don’t do what NordVPN and eSentire did. Both of their PR firms sent out predictions for 2018 in email messages, and neither of them posted any of this content online. That isn’t helpful, especially in a world where you want to cite a URL for any predictions-related materials.

Then there is this encyclopedic listing from our colleagues at MSSP Alert of dozens of predictions, culled from various security management vendors. We dare you to read through the entire list, which spans multiple pages. Sometimes less is more!

Finally, here is a somewhat different twist on the predictions route.Varonis put together a post that contained quotes from a series of podcasts. It was a good try, and a terrific example of repurposing content. But it held little value for discerning audiences that would want more context in their analysis.