The new world of hybrid warfare: cutting undersea cables

The song from The Little Mermaid goes “Under the sea, darling it’s better down where it is wetter.” Well, not quite.

This week the hybrid war between Russia and the rest of the world took a new turn, with the seizure of the bulk carrier Vezhon by the Swedish Coast Guard. The details are provided in Sal Mercogliano‘s video – it is now the fourth ship that was suspected of dragging its anchor in the Baltic Sea and cutting an undersea cable. This time it was a cable which runs between Latvia and Sweden. Let’s unpack this situation.

There are hundreds of thousands of miles of cables that run across the ocean seabed around the world, divided mostly into those carrying communications and others that move electrical power to remote locations. Laying these cables is a tricky operation, and there are specialized ships that do this. By way of reference, you might enjoy this Fluctus video on how undersea cables are made, laid and repaired.

The videos show how the cables can deteriorate over time as various sea life attaches itself (think a thick layer of barnacles and lots of corrosion) – getting through that junk at underwater depths isn’t easy. Divers have had to develop new tools and repair methods.

Last summer we had a cable cut in front of my home as contractors installed new streetlights. They ended up severing a major AT&T fiber cable that had hundreds of individual strands. While working a few feet below the street wasn’t a picnic, it is nothing like the conditions faced to do these repairs on the seabed.

Much easier is how a ship’s anchor can be dropped and dragged along the bottom. The cables are clearly shown on marine maps – this is a feature and not a bug because prior to the Russian sabotage events, the marine transportation community wanted mariners to know where the cables ran so that ships would steer clear of them. Here is a more stylized map showing how many cables are laid in the Baltic region.

Sal’s analysis (I feel like we should be on a first-name basis because I have been a fan of his videos since the Baltimore bridge accident two years ago) concludes that having four cable cuts in a few months in nearly the same area is suspicious. An update has found that the ship’s anchor accidentally broke. Yup.

As a mariner himself he shows how anchors on these large ships are controlled and how easy it would be to lower one undetected by the ship’s navigators. He calls this part of a hybrid war – meaning that it combines the traditional “kinetic” war fighting (with guns, tanks, and missiles) with more technology-based things such as drones with careful targeting of digital infrastructure, such as seabed cables and satellite internet access. The hybrid nature also combines military targets with civilian ones, such as communication cables that connect countries.

Ukraine has deployed hybrid techniques in its war with Russia. And I am sure that we could find instances of US and our allies using similar tactics. What it means is that life under the sea has become the new battleground. Sorry, Sebastian!

CSOonline: Python administrator moves to improve software security

The administrators of the Python Package Index (PyPI) have begun an effort to improve the hundreds of thousands of software packages that are listed. The attempt, which began earlier last year, is to identify and stop malware-laced packages from proliferating across the open-source community that contributes and consumes Python software.

The effort called Project Quarantine is described in blog post by Mike Fiedler, who is the sole administrator responsible for Python security. The project allows PyPI administrators and a select group of developers to mark a project as potentially harmful and prevent it from being easily installed by users, avoiding further harm.

In my blog post for CSOonline, I describe this effort and how it came about.

CSOonline: SOAR buyer’s guide, 11 products compared

The class of products called SOAR, for Security Orchestration, Automation and Response, has undergone a major transformation in the past few years. Features in each of the four words in its description that were once exclusive to SOAR have bled into other tools. For example, responses can be found now in endpoint detection and response tools. Orchestration is now a joint effort with SIEM tools. Many of these features are now found in managed security products that go by other names, such as threat and incident response or cloud security posture management (CSPM). And many of the SOAR tools are no longer just focused on security but have expanded to cover the wider context of how an enterprise infrastructure operates.

In this review for CSOonline, I cover some of the major issues for enterprises that are looking for a SOAR tool and briefly mention 11 vendors (out of dozens that offer such products). Be warned that these products are pricey, and finding true price transparency is almost impossible without engaging the vendors’ sales teams.

CSOonline: Top 5 security mistakes software developers make

Creating and enforcing the best security practices for application development teams isn’t easy. Software developers don’t necessarily write their code with these in mind, and as the appdev landscape becomes more complex, securing apps becomes more of a challenge to handle cloud computing, containers, and API connections. It is a big problem: Security flaws were found in 80% of the applications scanned by Veracode in a recent analysis.

As attacks continue to plague cybersecurity leaders, I compiled a list of five common mistakes by software developers and how they can be prevented for a piece for CSOonline.

CSOonline: Top IDS/IPS tools

An intrusion detection or prevention system can mean the difference between a safe network and a nasty breach. We’ve rounded up some of the best and most popular IDS/IPS products on the market.

Detecting and preventing network intrusions used to be the bread and butter of IT security. But over the past few years, analysts and defenders have seen a slow but steady transition from these products. They have become a component of a broader spectrum of network defensive tools, such as security information and event management (SIEM) systems, security orchestration and response (SOAR) and endpoint and network management and detection systems.

For CSO, I examined the top six commercial tools and four open source ones, explain the different approaches and form factors used, and compare how intrusion prevention fits into the overall security marketplace.

Ways to harden your VPN

Susan Bradley writes today in CSOonline about ways to improve your password hygiene, especially if you are using a VPN to connect to your corporate network. I am horrified to report that I am guilty of doing Bad Things according to Bradley, and what is worse, that I should know better. Let’s review her suggestions:

First, one of the common attacks is taking advantage of password fatigue, whereby someone can gain access to your accounts by trying to figure out your password that was published on the dark web. She writes: “Too many people merely add a letter to a password rather than choosing a better passphrase.” That hand going up in the front of the room is my own. There is no excuse for it — I have a password manager that can make my passwords as complex as need be. Sometimes I add a character in the middle of my previous password. Far better to use multi-factor authentication, she says. I would agree with her, but many of the hundreds of my logins don’t support MFA. That is another travesty, to be sure. But color me lazy.

Another no-no is defending your login by looking for what is called “impossible travel” — whereby your login happens in one place, and your credentials are used in another place halfway across the planet shortly thereafter. VPNs check for this using location tracking. Wait, I thought this was good practice? Not any more: Bradley says this offers a false sense of security and we shouldn’t rely on geolocation blocking. Attackers have figured out ways around the blocks or obscure their locations.

Finally, she offers this wisdom: “It doesn’t hurt to reevaluate your current VPN platforms and consider alternatives such as managed-cloud VPN solutions, bearing in mind that MFA should be mandatory on all accounts.”

Bradley also runs AskWoody, another excellent resource.

On cargo cranes and undersea cables

What do cargo cranes, drones and undersea cables have in common? This isn’t a trick question. All three have significant intersections with Chinese businesses, and all three could be considered critical infrastructure elements that has got our Congress worried. And while normally I wouldn’t highlight the fear mongering (we have enough of that, especially lately), this seems to merit some attention.

joint Congressional report was released this week which focuses on Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, a Chinese company which accounts for roughly 80% of the ship-to-shore port cranes operational in the US, and 70% of the worldwide port cranes. These are those huge structures that take cargo off and on container ships. What has got Congress worried is that the cranes are fitted with cellular modems which may have remote software installed. Much of the control systems used by these cranes is subcontracted to industrial suppliers such as ABB and Siemens. However, their gear is shipped to Shanghai and installed by the Chinese before the crane is sent to the ultimate port destination. The investigation found that these companies allow for their gear to be sitting in China for long periods of time outside of their operational control. As you might have guessed, there are no US-based crane manufacturers.

The report cites that more than a dozen software vulnerabilities from SZHI have been reported to American but not Chinese security regulators, saying that it could be a potential national cybersecurity issue.

Let’s move on to drones. The U.S. House of Representatives voted on Monday to bar new drones from Chinese drone manufacturer DJI from operating in the United States, one of a series of measures aimed at China that lawmakers are considering this week. The bill, which still needs to be approved by the Senate before it could become law, would prohibit the company’s products from operating on U.S. communications infrastructure. It would not prevent existing DJI drones from operating in the United States. DJI has 80% of the US drone market share and 54% of the global drone market. Again, one motivation for this proposed ban is the potential for data collection from their operation. Another is the recent fears about Tik Tok data ownership.

Finally, Tom’s Hardware reports that the US and EU are working on a draft statement about undersea communications cable ownership. The proposed language would intentionally exclude Chinese ownership and ask member countries to only consider “trusted suppliers from allied countries,” and require cable operators to have supply chain and data security measures in place, along with more transparent ownership documentation. The lofty proposed language doesn’t specify any enforcement mechanisms, however. The cable market is not yet dominated by any Chinese supplier and is quite competitive. The major US supplier is SubCom.  You might have guessed that here the US dominates in terms of cable ownership, with Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook/Meta owning or leasing at least half of all undersea bandwidth. I am not sure whether FAANG or China would be more of an issue to our regulators.

It is hard to sort out the technology issues from the political, something we have seen with the various Tik Tok screeds. it is clear that figuring out what is happening, understanding the extent of Chinese market control, and understanding whether insidious remote control software is actually present or could be present is a difficult lift.

CSOonline: AI-SPM buyer’s guide

Widespread adoption of generative AI across businesses has increased the need for contingencies, including AI security software. It is a tall order because AI’s reach into an organization’s infrastructure and data is enormous, meaning that there is a broad spectrum of protective measures required. This is one of the reasons why attackers are drawn to AI abuses.

I examined nine vendors’ tools that handle AI security posture management (AI-SPM). This is an emerging field and unfortunately that means most products are nowhere near as comprehensive or as integrated as they could be. You can read my buyer’s guide in CSOonline here. For your reference, here are a collection of AI SPM screenshots

The evolution of how brand impersonation attacks use social media

A new academic study of more than 1.3 million social media accounts was given recently at this month’s Usenix conference in Philadelphia. The paper, entitled The Imitation Game: Exploring Brand Impersonation Attacks on Social Media Platforms, makes for interesting reading and sadly shows just how well developed this ecosystem is. Ironically, as business brands pay more attention to social media interactions with their customers, they also enable imposters to launch attacks because people now expect companies to interact with social media. This means that there are many scam accounts that impersonate the brands to create confusion. These lure customers into providing private data and can result in stolen funds and further attacks. The research claims to be the first large-scale measurement of the social scamming ecosystem.

The research team, which was composed of academics from Germany and the US as well as from Paypal, identified almost 350,000 usernames performing various typosquatting techniques to impersonate more than 2,800 brands across Twitter (I know it is called something else, don’t remind me), Instagram, YouTube and Telegram.

Typosquatting is using deliberate typos in user and domain names to make it appear that paypel_support is really the people answering your connection problems. It is not a new problem when it comes to domain names, but as I wrote earlier this year for DarkReading, its use is proliferating in a variety of ways. One way that I didn’t mention is how fraudsters are using it across social media networks. Twitter “is the primary platform for brand impersonation attacks, with fraudsters frequently using typosquatting in their usernames. Roughly a third of these deceptive profiles also use official logos to appear more legitimate.”

The team found that brand impersonation involves multiple steps: after setting up a fake profile (oftentimes using the real brand’s logo to lend legitimacy), the fraudsters engage with customers through posts and offer phony incentives such as discount cards, free services and the like. But the attackers then collect sensitive data, including identities, credit card numbers and other details that are used to engage them in other fraudulent activities.

The most commonly targeted brand is Netflix, which is troubling because right now Netflix is sending out numerous legit messages heralding a change in their account pricing. Apple is the second most targeted brand.

The researchers have several suggestions to try to stem the tide, but admit these will be tough to implement. One of them is pretty obvious: in their work with Paypal, they found that many brands haven’t done their homework and failed to use Know Your Customer methods and continually scan for stolen identities, monitoring their brand mentions online or check for fraud card usage. One recommendation is to send out a quick autoresponse to a customer query to try to engage them before the scammer does. Another is for social media platforms to validate a brand when a new account is created, so that the owner of the proposed paypel_support account really is someone@paypal.com and not fakeuser123123@gmail.

Tech+Main podcast: The changing role of today’s CISOs

I spoke to Shaun St. Hill, host of the Tech&Main podcast, about the latest YL Ventures CISO Circuit Report. They have a very strong advisory panel of security professionals and annually poll them about industry trends, what their biggest organizational challenges are, and how they interact with their management and boards of directors to protect their companies.

You can listen to the 30 min. podcast here.